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DETERMINANTS OF ACCOUNTING CHOICE IN EGYPT 
Abstract 
In recent years, Egypt has been developing rapidly from a socialist to a fully developed 
market-based economy. One may expect that this economic transition towards a more 
capitalist orientation will influence the country’s cultural and socio-economic environment, 
and consequently the behaviour of its corporate managers. The increasing separation of 
ownership and control of capital could be expected to increase agency problems associated 
with managerial decisions. In these circumstances, it should be interesting to identify whether 
‘positive accounting’ hypotheses would apply in such an environment. Therefore, this paper 
examines the relevance to financial reporting in Egypt of some established positive 
accounting theory hypotheses in addition to a new hypothesis related to taxation. The 
evidence of the study is consistent with the validity of the conventional ‘bonus’ and ‘debt’ 
hypotheses and the new ‘taxation’ hypothesis. These conclusions are also consistent with 
recent empirical studies of cultural and socio-economic change in Egypt. 
Keywords:  Accounting choice, positive accounting theories, Egypt, developing capitalist 
economies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Egypt is a predominantly Islamic country that since the mid-1980s has sought to replace its 
socialist planned economy and associated nationalised industries with a growing capitalist 
economy. This political and economic transition provides an interesting context within which 
the evolution of accounting practices and the behaviour of economic agents may be studied 
(see, for example, Gray et al., 1984; Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Brown and Humphreys, 1995; 
Humphreys, 1996; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; HassabElnaby and Mosebach, 2005). 
Managers’ behavior may be influenced by the ethical, cultural and institutional environments 
in which they operate. Some research has suggested that significant cultural differences may 
exist between Egyptian and Anglo-American corporate environments (Humphreys, 1996).  
Nevertheless, more recent research has argued that the changes in the Egyptian economy have 
been accompanied by significant changes in its national culture. It is reasoned that these 
changes have in turn produced a change in accounting choices, so that the latter are 
increasingly similar to those employed in developed market-based economies (HassabElnaby 
and Mosebach, 2005).  
  The precise nature of the relationship between national culture and managerial 
behaviour is complex, and beyond the scope of this paper. However, there is no doubt about 
the scale and significance of Egypt’s transition towards a market-based economy in recent 
years. The process of reform has been accelerating since 1986, when the privatisation of the 
country’s state-owned utilities was initiated. Since 1991, the Cairo stock market has been 
reopened, Egypt has joined the World Trade Organisation and it has also established 
international trade and investment agreements with the US and the European Union. Egypt 
therefore provides an especially interesting situation for testing the expectations of self-
serving personal wealth maximizing behavior by individuals. One could reason that the 
maximisation of personal utility seems as likely to describe the motivation of Egyptian 
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managers as it does of Western managers. This reasoning is adopted here, and leads to the 
hypothesis that, subject to dominating ethical and institutional constraints, Egyptian managers 
and investors would prefer more wealth to less wealth.  
  Nevertheless, it is probably necessary to recognise that the business environment in 
Egypt is still different in some important respects to that in established capitalist economies. 
More specifically, while Egypt’s capital markets are developing rapidly, many large quoted 
and unquoted Egyptian businesses are owned and controlled by relatively small numbers of 
people. Consequently, a comparatively high proportion of businesses are owner-controlled 
relative to their counterparts in the USA or the UK (see PCSU, 2000; World Bank, 2001). 
This institutional factor might affect the behaviour of managers who are agents, because they 
are likely to be more closely monitored. Existing literature suggests that a relationship may be 
identified between the level of owners’ control and (at least some) accounting choices 
(Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Abdel Khalik, 1985; Hunt, 1986; Penno and Simon, 1986; Niehaus, 
1989; Carlson and Bathala, 1997). In contrast to their counterparts in closely held firms, 
managers of Egyptian companies with widely dispersed share ownership frequently face very 
little external supervision of their decisions (PCSU, 2000; World Bank, 2001). Thus, they 
might with impunity often pursue their own interests – even if these conflict with the 
objectives of shareholders. 
  Positive accounting theory (PAT) (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 1986) assumes that 
accounting choices are influenced by managerial opportunism. PAT researchers hypothesise 
that (a) to increase their own remuneration when it is based on accounting earnings and (b) to 
avoid violating debt covenants, managers will often prefer income-increasing accounting 
methods. These PAT hypotheses have been frequently tested in western industrialised 
countries (for a summary, see Fields et al., 2001), but their relevance to the economies of 
other countries is relatively less well researched. However, given the current socio-economic 
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climate in Egypt, we believe that standard PAT hypotheses may be appropriate. 
Consequently, this paper is based on a hypothesis that the motivations and behaviour of 
Egyptian businessmen are similar to those of their Anglo-American counterparts and do not 
differ because of any cultural or institutional factors identified elsewhere in the literature 
referenced. Although the empirical evidence was obtained in Egypt, it may be argued that 
such evidence has wider significance for other Middle-Eastern countries with capitalist 
economies. 
 This paper therefore reasons that the empirical evidence in Egypt will be consistent 
with the conventional (a) bonus plan and (b) debt PAT hypotheses (see Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; 1990). In addition, the paper develops and tests a development of the 
hypothesis that managers will “make accounting choices in order to reduce their tax burden 
(and thus increase their cash flows)” (Fields et al., 2001, p.284). The derived hypothesis is 
that managers are more likely to choose accounting income increasing reporting methods that 
do not increase the current taxation charges on income than those that do increase those 
charges. This test is possible because of the Egyptian regulations for calculating taxable 
income, which are similar to those operating in the UK and the USA.  
The reported empirical study follows conventional practice, because it uses an 
established database of financial information for firms quoted on the Egyptian stock market. 
However, that market is still small relative to Anglo-American counterparts. Consequently the 
study also analyses information from an independent questionnaire survey. This 
methodological expansion enables comparison of the findings from each independent source 
and allows the study to be extended to many large firms that are not quoted on the stock 
exchange as well as to companies that are too small to be listed.  
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DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
PAT considers the factors that influence managers’ choices of accounting policies (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; 1986; 1990) and suggests that managers will act opportunistically when 
their accounting choices have economic consequences. It has generated very extensive 
empirical research, detailed reviews of which are available elsewhere (see, for example, 
Fields et al., 2001). Accounting variables have economic consequences because remuneration 
and borrowing contracts often use such variables in an attempt to resolve agency conflicts 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). They also have economic consequences when they affect 
the computation of taxable income, because they then directly affect the timing of cash 
outflows from a business and consequently the availability of money to finance the firm’s 
activities and its payments to participants in the business (Fields et al., 2001). PAT 
hypothesises that managers use their discretion to increase accounting profit in order to 
maximise their bonuses (the ‘bonus plan hypothesis’) and to avoid constraints associated with 
borrowing (the ‘debt covenant hypothesis’). A further hypothesis is that managers accounting 
decisions will be affected by their impact on the amount or timing of payments for taxation 
(Fields et al., 2001). Increases in accounting income can often result in increases in current 
taxation, while one could expect rational managers to seek to avoid. 
  It is often assumed that current reported earnings can be increased by adopting: FIFO 
for inventory valuation; operating rather than capital leases; straight-line depreciation; and 
pooling-of-interests accounting. Increases in such earnings would frequently increase current 
earnings-based compensation and reduce the likelihood of breaching any contractual or 
implied accounting-based constraints associated with borrowing. Unfortunately, they may 
also increase current taxable income and therefore advance the time for payment of tax on 
earnings over the firm’s lifetime, with adverse effects on financing. Consequently there may 
be conflicting motivations – some for increasing reported earnings, others for reducing such 
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earnings. 
 
Bonus Plans Hypotheses 
The relationships between the existence of bonus plans and accounting policies have been 
extensively researched in Anglo-American economies. Evidence by Healy (1985), Gaver et 
al. (1995), Holthausen et al. (1995) and Guidry et al. (1999) suggests that managers in large 
firms managed by agents select accounting methods that transfer wealth to themselves from 
the firm’s equity holders. Accounting earnings are expected to possess desirable 
characteristics not shared by other performance measures, including objectivity, reliability, 
verifiability and conservatism (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). They may therefore provide a 
more appropriate basis for evaluating a manager’s performance than alternative measures 
(Healy, 1985; Sloan, 1993; Dechow, 1994; Emanuel et al., 2003)1 and are extensively, but not 
exclusively, used for that purpose. Bonus schemes are one approach to reducing agency 
conflicts between a firm’s managers and its owners by rewarding or punishing poor financial 
performance of managers (Smith and Watts, 1982; Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986; Sloan, 1993). They are frequently based on accounting earnings, and it can be assumed 
that they are positively associated with earnings. A further assumption that executives will 
prefer higher to lower personal current income then leads to the conventional bonus 
hypothesis that, subject to the operation of contractual minimum income level constraints, 
managers with bonus schemes are more likely to choose current income–increasing 
accounting methods (Ittner et al., 1997, Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981)2. Such choices 
would accelerate wealth transfers to the managers from the equity holders3.  
It is possible that Egyptian managers’ behaviour is constrained by their specific socio-
economic environment (Humphreys, 1996). Nevertheless, the recent shift towards a market-
based economy appears to have introduced capitalist business practices (HassabElnaby and 
6 
 
Mosebach, 2005). This paper takes the view that there is no apparent reason to believe that 
Egyptian managers have different personal wealth-related motivations to those of their 
counterparts in Western capitalist countries. Hence one would expect that the relationships 
between bonus schemes (where they exist) and accounting choices that have been observed in 
other capitalist economies will also be observed in Egypt. Consequently, it is assumed here 
that the conventional PAT bonus plan hypothesis is relevant in Egypt. It is adapted in the 
current research to the alternative hypothesis (H1), below. 
H1 Alternative: In Egypt, managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely to adopt 
current income–increasing accounting choices than those without bonus plans. 
 
Debt Contracts Hypothesis 
The literature about the association between levels of financial gearing and accounting 
policies (see, for example, Bowen et al., 2000) usually focuses on long–term debt (Duke and 
Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Sweeney, 1994). Violation of contractual debt 
covenants can impose significant costs on firms. Since current income increasing accounting 
methods can reduce the immediate constraints from some commonly observed covenants4, 
managers have incentives to use such methods when such constraints might be activated. An 
assumption that the likelihood of violating covenants is positively associated with gearing 
then leads to the conventional debt hypothesis that the level of gearing is positively associated 
with the extent to which managers choose income increasing accounting methods (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; 1986). Other things being equal, an increase in accounting earnings will 
increase the book value of equity and consequently reduce the gearing ratio (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). Much of the literature relates to the existence of 
contractual accounting based debt covenants. One can reasonably also claim, however, that 
the existence of relatively high levels of financial gearing is likely to either deter potential 
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lenders or alternatively to lead them to impose more onerous conditions in any loan contract. 
Consequently, levels of financial gearing that are considered to be high, relative to other firms 
in the industry involved, can be expected to reduce further financing opportunities. Therefore, 
there are implicit institutional constraints on the acceptable level of leverage. Logically, the 
strength of managers’ motivations reflected in the debt hypothesis depends on the costs of 
violating the firm’s debt covenants (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983) and on the likelihood 
that the gearing level will adversely affect future financing. The empirical evidence on the 
debt hypothesis remains largely mixed. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) 
reported results which were consistent with it, but Healy and Palepu (1990) and DeAngelo et 
al. (1994) documented an inconsistent set of results.  
  Most prior research has examined large Western corporations that issue long–term 
bonds and have an extensive equity base. In contrast, banks are the main source of borrowing 
by Egyptian industry; sometimes banks also own a percentage of the share capital (PCSU, 
2000). Relationships and contracts with Egyptian lenders could therefore be significantly 
different to those in Western capitalist economies. Given this situation, the debt covenant 
hypothesis might not offer the same explanatory power for the accounting choices of 
Egyptian companies. HassabElnaby and Mosebach (2005) identified that accounting-based 
debt covenants (ABDCs) are used less frequently in Egypt than in the USA. Nevertheless, 
many Egyptian corporations rely heavily on debt, and HassabElnaby and Mosebach did 
observe an increasing trend towards the use of ABDCs in Egypt. They also noted that gearing 
ratios were the most frequently used ABDC. There seems to be no reason why the above 
mentioned implicit gearing related constraints on borrowing should not apply in Egypt. 
Consequently, despite the lower level of contractual constraints, the conventional debt 
covenant hypothesis is assumed to be relevant to Egypt despite the different contracting 
environment. Therefore, this paper adopts that hypothesis, treating gearing as the independent 
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variable and current income increasing accounting methods as the dependent variables. H2 is 
the resulting hypothesis. 
 
 H2 (Alternative): In Egyptian firms, the use of current income–increasing accounting 
choices is positively associated with leverage. 
 
 Some taxation regimes make stipulated adjustments to accounting income when 
computing taxable income. A particularly important adjustment in many countries, which is 
also made in Egypt, relates to depreciation. Accounting depreciation is disallowed for tax 
purposes and is replaced by depreciation allowances that are calculated using methods and 
rates that are stipulated by the government agencies involved. In contrast, inventory 
valuations in the income statements are accepted without adjustments for taxation purposes, 
provided that they comply with acceptable accounting standards. The consequences are that 
enhancements to accounting income arising from policy choices affecting depreciation do not 
incur an extra tax charge, whereas those arising from inventory valuations do incur a charge. 
 Appendix 1 models the differences that arise from the different situations5. It 
demonstrates that: (a) managers will always receive less bonus (based on after tax profits) 
from increases in accounting income that are subject to tax than those that are not subject to 
tax (the difference could be large with high rates of tax); (b) that the reduction in the firm’s 
cash flows is higher with taxable enhancements than with non-taxable enhancements with any 
positive rate of taxation and bonus rates of less than 100% of the income enhancement; and 
(c) that rejection of income enhancing accounting adjustments will usually lead to higher 
future bonuses when the resulting enhancements are taxable than when they are not taxable. 
Consequently, managers with bonus plans, based on after-tax earnings, will gain more 
personal wealth from accounting policies that increase income without effect on tax charges 
than from policies which result in increases in current tax charges. The reasoning and 
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evidence that underpin the adoption of the debt hypothesis (H2) suggests that bonus schemes 
may not be the only motivation for increasing earnings. Clearly, when managers increase 
taxable profit in order to achieve other benefits, such as enhanced borrowing capacity, current 
taxation costs will usually also increase. Consequently, there is a clear advantage to managers 
who wish to increase reported earnings to make policy decisions that do not affect tax charges 
(see, for example, Fields et al., 2001 for a discussion concerning the choice of accounting 
policies that reduce tax charges). This leads to an expectation that rational managers would 
prefer to make accounting income increasing adjustments that do not affect tax charges to 
those that affect such charges. 
 Accepting these arguments leads to the following hypothesis: 
 H3 (Alternative): In Egyptian firms, managers with bonus schemes are more likely to 
adopt current income increasing accounting methods that do not affect taxation 
charges than methods that increase taxation charges. 
 
EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses H1 and H2 identify the dependent variable ‘current income-increasing 
accounting choice’ and independent variables ‘management bonus scheme’ and ‘leverage’. In 
order to test them one needs to identify empirically observable data that can proxy for such 
variables. In the past, accounting choices whose effect on current net income is relatively 
unambiguous and which are usually disclosed in the corporation’s annual report have been 
used as proxies for current income increasing policies (see, for example, Hagerman and 
Zmijewski, 1979; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1988). This 
paper follows a similar strategy. 
The dependent variables most widely used in the literature to indicate income 
increasing accounting methods are depreciation method, inventory method, the treatment of 
investment tax credits and the period of pension amortisation (see, for example, Hagerman 
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and Zmijewski, 1979; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Penno 
and Simon, 1986; Dhaliwal, 1988; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Bowen et al., 2000; Bowen et 
al., 2002). Investment tax credits operate in the USA and some Western countries but not in 
Egypt. Also, pension amortisation does not appear in the Egyptian income statements, 
because under Egyptian Accounting Standard (EAS) No. 21 the pension system is subject to a 
special fund system and the investment of this special fund has a separate financial statement.  
This study therefore only examines depreciation method (using the subscript ‘a’) and 
inventory valuation choices (using ‘b’), which arguably are sufficient because they can have 
large and systematic effects on the assets and expenses reported in firms’ financial statements 
(Bowen et al., 2000; 2002). The literature usually assumes that the adoption of (a) straight-
line depreciation (SLD) and (b) the first-in-first-out (FIFO) stock valuation method will 
increase reported earnings in the short–term. FIFO will only consistently increase current 
earnings if replacement costs of inventory usually rise over time, which has occurred in 
Egypt, where average annual inflation ranged between 2.8% and 9.4% during the period 1994 
to 2001. The conventional assumptions are therefore relevant to, and are adopted in, this 
study. They lead to two sets of empirically testable sub-hypotheses, Ha refers to depreciation 
and Hb to inventory valuation. 
As indicated above, the commonly identified economic factors that might influence a 
firm’s choice of accounting methods are in this paper hypothesised to be the existence of a 
management bonus scheme and a firm’s gearing characteristics (see H1 and H2).  Healy 
(1985) has shown that the contractual details of specific bonus plans can have a significant 
effect on managers’ accounting choices. Such details are not publicly available in Egypt. 
Consequently, when testing H1, the bonus variable (MP) was measured as one (1) if the 
managers have bonus plans based on accounting numbers and zero (0) if not. H2 was tested 
using firms’ total debt to total assets as the independent variables. Both that variable and the 
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long–term debt to equity ratio have been widely employed in the literature as proxies for a 
firms’ dependency on debt financing (Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Healy 
and Palepu, 1990; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Jung and Kwon, 2002; Bauwhede et al., 2003). 
HassabElnaby and Mosebach (2005) observed that in Egypt the most widely used constraint 
was ‘tangible net worth’. Nevertheless, the total debt to total assets ratio was chosen in this 
study because the alternatives were not identifiable from the survey data. Although the ratio 
of debt to tangible net worth was available for database firms, the debt to total assets ratio was 
also used for those firms, in order to enhance comparability of the findings concerning the 
two data sets. The likelihood of observing significant relationships will be reduced if total 
assets is an inferior basis compared to net assets. Consequently, any such relationships, if 
found, are likely to be acceptable evidence. The same reasoning would also apply if gearing is 
considered to be inferior to interest coverage as a representation of potential debt-related 
constraints, which is perhaps unlikely in Egypt given HassabElnaby and Mosebach’s 
observations. 
Adoption of the proxy variables identified above enables the hypotheses H1 and H2 to 
be reformulated by replacing the terms ‘current income increasing accounting choices’ by (a) 
straight-line depreciation (SLD) and (b) first-in first-out (FIFO) stock valuation for each test. 
Table 1 shows the resulting hypothesised associations for H1 and H2.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As indicated above, in Egypt reductions in depreciation figures in the financial 
statements do not give rise to increases in taxation charges. In contrast, increases in the value 
of inventory will increase taxation charges (Abdel-Rahman, 2001). Therefore the empirical 
alternative hypothesis for H3 can be formulated as: 
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H3 (Alternative): In Egyptian firms, managers are more likely to use SLD than FIFO 
methods. 
Table 2 summarises the variables used in the study and the basis on which they were 
measured. A measure of size is included as a control variable6, because such measures have 
been found to influence the findings of other relevant empirical studies. In their review of 14 
papers from the empirical research literature on accounting choice, Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1983) found that firm size and gearing were the only two significant variables explaining 
choices of accounting techniques (see also Fields et al., 2001). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA 
Accounting policies, the use of management bonus plans and gearing were obtained from 
databases7 of companies listed on the Cairo Stock Exchange. Most empirical studies of 
accounting choice tend to rely on such sources, but in this case the available data was limited 
to companies that were actively traded8. Consequently, the resulting database sample of 96 
companies9 was biased towards businesses that were larger and more widely held than most 
Egyptian firms. It was thought that information about smaller firms and those with more 
concentrated ownership would enhance the study; a questionnaire was therefore distributed to 
the 320 largest (by working capital in 2001) firms10 operating in the Cairo, Alexandria and 
Menoufia Governorates, which are the most industrialised areas in Egypt. Ninety-three firms 
responded to the questionnaire, a response rate of 29%. The sizes of the firms in the database 
and the survey are shown in Table 3, using both total sales and total assets11. The mean of 
SALES categories (1 to 8) is 3.9 for the survey companies and 5.4 for the database firms, so 
on average firms included in the database have larger sales than their counterparts included in 
the survey. Similarly, for total assets the mean categories are 3.0 for the survey firms and 4.58 
13 
 
for the database firms. Table 3 shows that the range of values for both assets and sales in each 
category are unequal. This arose because the ranges appearing in the questionnaire were set in 
Egypt by the researcher administering the instrument, on the advice of local experts. The 
figures are, however, approximately on logarithmic scales. In order to enhance comparability 
with the survey results, the database firms were then analyzed using the same categories as 
applied to the survey firms – but with an extension of the categories because of the greater 
range of values involved. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
  Clearly, the companies in the database were on average much larger than those in the 
survey. There may have been a small overlap between the respondents in the survey and the 
firms identified in the database12, because more than half of the respondent firms in the 
questionnaire survey are listed on the stock exchange. Nevertheless, most of the latter are 
likely to be infrequently traded firms not included in the database. For the purposes of 
statistical analysis, the two samples were kept separate and the same tests were applied 
independently to both samples.  
  Table 4 shows information concerning the adoption of bonus schemes. Such schemes 
are clearly used to motivate agent-managers. They are unnecessary for controlling owner-
managers, who are able to determine for themselves the amount of cash withdrawn from the 
business for personal use. This paper therefore assumes that the existence or absence of bonus 
schemes indicates the ownership-control status of the firm.  Comparison of survey and 
database firms in table 4 then suggests that far more of the database firms were agent 
managed firms than was the case with the survey firms.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The hypotheses H1 and H2 are tested by examining the association between the use of SLD 
and FIFO and (i) the existence of bonus schemes and (ii) the level of leverage. H3 is tested by 
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examining the association between the choice of SLD and that of FIFO. The null hypotheses 
are all direct negatives of the alternative hypotheses.  
  The data used in the analysis was obtained from the survey and from the database, and 
not from a designed experiment. Consequently, the distribution of firms and managers with 
various characteristics arises by chance and may not allow straightforward comparisons of the 
effects as orthogonal contrasts. At least the usual level of multi-collinearity can be expected to 
be encountered in the data sets constructed. The existence of relationships between possible 
explanatory variables creates difficulties in ascribing different outcomes as being attributable 
to different levels of those variables. Given that situation, it is conventional practice to 
employ both simple and multivariate analysis to provide additional evidence in support of the 
multivariate findings. This paper adopts such a procedure in testing hypotheses H1 and H2 
(see, for example Dechow et al., 1996). 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for firms in the survey while Panel B 
does likewise for the database. Table 5 shows that, on average, firms included in the database 
have higher debt-to-total asset ratios than firms included in the survey, (with a mean of 3.5 
compared with 2.4). They also make greater use of bonus schemes (mean 0.72) than firms in 
the survey (mean 0.54) implying that more of the survey firms are owner-managed. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Univariate Analysis 
As indicated above, hypotheses H1 and H2 were tested separately from data recorded from 
the database and survey using univariate analysis13 and multivariate analysis (see, for 
example, Dechow et al., 1996). The results of the univariate analysis for H1 and H2 are set 
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out in detail in Appendix 2 and summarised in Table 6. This indicates for H1 that MP, which 
is a proxy for management incentive plans, is significantly positively associated (at the 1% 
level) with management’s choice of income–increasing methods (depreciation and inventory). 
This finding is consistent across both the questionnaire survey and the database firms so the 
null for H1 can be rejected. That observation is consistent with the prediction that managers 
with bonus plans are more likely to adopt income–increasing accounting choices than those 
without such bonus-based incentives (H1a and H1b).  
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
   The results for the gearing hypothesis H2 indicate that LEV, which is used as a proxy 
for the existence and tightness of a firm’s debt covenants, is positively and significantly 
associated (at the 5% level) with management’s choice of income increasing depreciation 
methods in the database. Yet the association is not significant in the questionnaire survey. 
This could reflect the much lower average level of gearing (relative to the database) shown in 
Table 5. Although the coefficient of the associations between LEV and management’s choice 
of FIFO are positive, the associations are not statistically significant in either the 
questionnaire survey or the database. The null hypothesis H2a can be rejected for the 
database, but the nulls for H2b and H2a for the survey cannot be rejected. Overall, the 
univariate results provide some support for the hypothesis that the higher the leverage, the 
greater the likelihood that a firm will choose the income increasing depreciation methods 
(H2a). They provide no significant support for the prediction that the higher the leverage, the 
greater the likelihood that a firm will choose the inventory valuation method which increases 
current income (H2b). As indicated above, depreciation charges are not used in taxation 
computations in Egypt, so increases in accounting earnings via reduced depreciation do not 
give rise to extra tax charges. The situation is different for inventory valuation – so one would 
expect executives to prefer adjustments made through depreciation to those made through a 
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change in the inventory method. 
  Table 7 shows the number of firms with bonus schemes that use SLD and FIFO. It is 
interesting to observe that, by comparison with the database sample, survey firms were much 
more likely to use FIFO, an income increasing method given the inflationary environment in 
Egypt. The reasons for this are unclear. There is clearly a much greater propensity for firms in 
both samples to use SLD than FIFO. This finding was tested using chi-squared analysis and 
the resultant p-value for H3 shown in Table 6 is statistically significant (at the 1% level). 
Therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected and the evidence is consistent with the validity 
of H3. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
  In summary, the univariate analyses results provide strong support for the bonus plans 
hypothesis (H1a and H1b). In addition, the results for the database are consistent with 
hypotheses H2a concerning the association between gearing and depreciation method, but 
there was no significant support for the hypothesis concerning depreciation from the survey. 
The hypothesis concerning the association between gearing and inventory valuation method 
(H2b) received no statistically significant support. The evidence provides strong support for 
the rejection of the null for H3. Overall, there appears to be a marked difference between 
accounting income accelerating behaviour relating to depreciation and to inventory – which 
could be attributable to their different treatment for taxation purposes.  
  One can reasonably claim that the univariate analysis provides evidence that the use of 
management incentive plans was positively and significantly related to the use of income 
increasing accounting choices, whether these choices related to depreciation or to inventory 
valuation methods. In the database, the level of gearing was significantly related to current 
income increasing depreciation accounting choices – although not to inventory decisions, 
which potentially affect charges for taxation. The analysis provides highly significant 
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evidence consistent with the hypothesis that taxation factors influence the relative preferences 
for accounting income increasing methods. The observations concerning bonuses and gearing 
are consistent with many of the findings of earlier studies using univariate analysis (Fields et 
al., 2001). In the next section, a multivariate analysis provides the possibility of different 
insights concerning the relative influences of explanatory variables.  
 
Multivariate Analysis  
The multivariate analysis was performed for the survey sample with the variables listed in 
Table 2. It was undertaken for the database sample using all of the variables in Tables 2 and 
814. Appendix 3 contains more information about the variables used. As Appendix 4 explains, 
use of this range of variables produced an unacceptable level of multi-collinearity. Standard 
statistical techniques were therefore used to identify the variables that provided the most 
significant models, which were then checked for plausibility.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE  
 
The identified variables were then used in the following logit model for each of the 
depreciation (DEP) and inventory (INV) valuation dependent variables. Consistent with the 
extant literature, β1 and β2 are predicted to be positive whereas β3 is predicted to be negative, 
i.e.: 
DEP (or INV) =β0 + β1 MPi+ β2 LEVi+ β3 SALESi        
 
 
Predicted signs             (+)          (+)           (-)        
 
Statistically significant results for the multivariate analysis are shown in Appendix 5 
and summarised in Table 9. The nulls for the set of H1 hypotheses are all rejected at highly 
significant levels. The results in that table show highly significant evidence consistent with 
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the research hypotheses H1a; firms that employ bonus plans seem more likely to opt for the 
SLD method than those without bonus plans (for the total survey and database samples). The 
survey and database samples also show strong evidence consistent with for the bonus 
hypotheses (H1b), when tested by reference to the use of FIFO. Results for the gearing 
hypothesis H2 are mixed. The samples show significant rejection of the null H2a 
(depreciation) for the database (at the 5% level) but not for the survey. The null is not rejected 
in either sample for inventory decisions. Interestingly, the multivariate analysis in Table 9 
shows exactly the same pattern of rejection of null hypotheses as the univariate analysis in 
Table 6. As indicated above, this observation provides an increased level of confidence that 
the observations reflect the characteristics of the samples. 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The findings from the study as a whole (including both univariate and multivariate analyses) 
suggest that the existence of management incentive plans are significantly positively 
associated with depreciation policies and inventory valuation methods that increase 
accounting income. Also, there is some evidence that the gearing of database companies is 
positively associated with the choice of straight-line depreciation. One can conclude that the 
study provides statistically strong evidence consistent with the relevance of the bonus PAT 
hypothesis to accounting in Egypt, and some limited evidence consistent with the debt 
contracts hypothesis. It provides strong evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers 
will prefer adjustments that do not increase tax payments to those that do increase such 
outlays. 
  It is perhaps not surprising that much of PAT, which is primarily based on the Anglo-
American experience and institutional environment, seems to be relevant to Egypt. Whilst this 
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paper has not directly explored the question, one may reason that managers’ motivations may 
to some extent be conditioned by the institutional, cultural, ethical and political environments 
in which they work. The findings of this study are consistent with recent research 
(HassabElnaby and Mosebach, 2005) which found an association between economic reform, 
socio-economic change, and accounting choice. In the climate of rapid institutional 
transformation to a market-driven economy, it could be expected that Egyptian managers will 
be influenced by ‘rational’ considerations of their personal wellbeing. The findings of this 
study suggest that motivations of managers in emerging capitalist economies may be 
influenced by similar factors to those that influence managerial behaviour in established 
capitalist economies.  
This study inevitably suffers from the limitations of the data on which it is based. In 
particular, one should emphasise that consistency with hypotheses is not ‘proof’ that the 
hypotheses are ‘correct’. There may be other reasons for accounting choices that are not 
identified in the study. The survey used in this analysis also sought data on respondents’ 
opinions of the reasons for the choice of depreciation and of stock valuation methods. 
Analysis of that data will be presented in a subsequent study. 
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Notes 
 
1 Other studies document a significant statistical association between variants of accounting earnings and 
incentive–pay programmes (see, for example, Antle and Smith, 1985; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). 
2 Hall (2002) noted that the use of stock options had increased substantially between 1990 and 1999 in the USA, 
but earnings-based bonuses are the most common in Egypt. 
3 Most of these methods result in lower earnings in later years – for example, increased inventory values in the 
current period lead to increased costs in subsequent periods. 
4 Increases in accounting income increase both the ratios of earnings to interest and (subject to any resulting 
withdrawals of cash by way of bonuses or additional dividends) of net assets to debt, both of which feature in 
debt contracts (see, for example, Duke and Hunt, 1990; Healy and Palepu, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 1990). 
5 This appendix proves what is perhaps intuitively obvious, but also shows analytically the interaction of 
variables in the differing situations. 
6 The selection of total sales as the specific proxy measure was motivated by (a) the wide range of industry 
sectors (both capital and labour intensive) included in the survey firms in the study and (b) the statistical 
limitations of using total assets data in the analysis (see note 11). 
7 Data was compiled from three resources: (i) the Capital Market Authority in Cairo, (ii) the Disclosure 
Department of Cairo Stock Exchange and (iii) the Kompass Egypt business database. The resulting database did 
not include information concerning industry classifications. 
8 The Egyptian Stock Exchange identifies companies as either, (i) actively traded; or (ii) rarely traded. The rarely 
traded companies are in most cases closely held. 
9 Only firms for which (a) the complete financial statements were obtained for the years 1999-2001 and which 
(b) adopted and disclosed unchanged depreciation and inventory policies during the years ending 1999-2001 
were included in the sample. The data used in the study is based on observations collected from the financial 
statements ending in 2001.  
10 It was felt that larger firms were more likely to exhibit the range of variables being investigated. 
11 Because the standard error of the coefficient of the variable for total assets was larger than it would have been 
with the absence of multicollinearity, this variable was not included as a control variable in the statistical 
analysis. 
12 Any direct comparison was prevented because of the anonymity of responses, adopted because it was judged 
that such a policy would increase the response rate. The distribution of questionnaires was not restricted to firms 
not included in the database, because it was intended to analyse each of the database and survey data sets 
independently and the authors felt that it was therefore preferable to send the survey to all firms in the identified 
category. Because of the independent analysis of each data set this has not resulted in double counting results. 
13 For the univariate statistical analysis the chi-squared test, using a 2 x 2 contingency table, was utilized to 
establish the association between the dependent variables and the dichotomous independent variable MP. The 
relationship between the dependent variables and the categorical independent variable LEV was investigated 
using the non-parametric Kendall’s tau-b test of association for ordinal variables.   
14 The data for all of the variables in Table 8 (with the exception of ASSETS) was not available for the survey 
sample. 
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Table 1: Alternative Sub-hypotheses for H1 and H2  
Positive association with use of  income-increasing methods  H1 (bonus plans) H2 (leverage) 
Firms using SLD  H1a  H2a 
Firms using FIFO  H1b  H2b 
 
 
Table 2: Variable Definitions and Measurement 
Variable Type of variable Measurement method 
Depreciation method (DEP) Dependent variable Coded 1 if the firm adopts SLD and 0 if the firm 
adopts other methods of depreciation.  
Inventory valuation method 
(INV) 
Dependent variable Coded 1 if the firm adopts FIFO method of 
inventory valuation and 0 if the firm chooses other 
methods of inventory valuation. 
Existence of Management 
incentive plans (MP) 
Independent variable Coded 1 if the managers have bonus plans based 
on accounting figures and 0 if not. 
Gearing (LEV) Independent variable The ratio computed by the company’s debt / total 
assets, coded 1 – 5. 
Firm Size (SALES) Control variable Measured by total sales, coded 1 – 5 in the survey 
sample and 1 – 8 in the database sample. 
Note:   LEV coded as 1= <20%, 2 = 20-40%, 3= 40-60%, 4= 60-80%, 5= >80%,  
SALES coded using the categories shown in Panel B of Table 3. 
Table 3: Categorisation by Total Assets and by Total Sales 
 Panel A: Total Assets Panel B: Total Sales 
 Survey Firms Database Firms Survey firms Database firms 
Cat. Assets (£m Egyptian) Total 
Assets (£m 
Egyptian) Total 
Sales (£m 
Egyptian) Total 
Sales (£m 
Egyptian) Total 
1 < 50 10 < 50 1 < 10 8 < 10 2 
2 50 – 100 27 50 – 100  7 10 – 25 11 10 – 25 2 
3 100 – 250 24 100 – 250  23 25 – 50 10 25 – 50 3 
4 250 – 500 16 250 – 500  17 50 – 100 18 50 – 100 18 
5 500 + 16 500 – 1,000  21 100 + 46 100 – 250 25 
6   1,000 – 2,500 13   250 – 500 18 
7   2,500 – 5,000 7   500 – 1,000 15 
8   > 5,000 7   > 1,000 9 
 TOTAL 93 TOTAL 96 TOTAL 93 TOTAL 92 
Note: Complete sales data for four companies from the database sample could not be obtained. 
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Table 4: Usage of Management Bonus Schemes 
Panel A: Survey firms 
 Number of firms % 
No bonus scheme 43 46.2 
Bonus scheme 50 53.8 
Total 93 100.0 
Panel B: Database firms 
 Number of firms % 
No bonus scheme 27 28.1 
Bonus scheme 69 71.9 
Total 96 100.0 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Survey firms 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
DEP 0.796 1 0.405 0 1 
INV 0.430 0 0.498 0 1 
MP 0.538 1 0.501 0 1 
LEV 2.355 2 1.204 1 5 
SALES 3.892 4 1.363 1 5 
Panel B: Database firms 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
DEP 0.885 1 0.320 0 1 
INV 0.198 0 0.401 0 1 
MP 0.719 1 0.452 0 1 
LEV 3.469 3 1.036 1 5 
SALES 5.402 5 1.569 1 8 
Note: See Table 2 for definitions of variables and for the scales and the bases on which they were measured. 
 
Table 6: A Summary of Results of the Univariate Analysis 
 
 
Depreciation  Inventory 
Survey Database Survey Database 
Null for H1 rejected  H1a H1b 
p = 0.000** p = 0.000** p = 0.0005** p = 0.003** 
Null for H2 rejected  H2a H2b 
p = 0.209 p = 0.019* p = 0.301 p = 0.711 
Null for H3 rejected for 
both survey & database 
H3 
p = 0.000** 
*significant at the 5% level 
**significant at the 1% level 
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Table 7: Summary of Usage of SLD and FIFO by Sampled Firms with Bonus Schemes 
 Survey Firms Database Firms 
Use SLD 49 68 
Do not use SLD 1 1 
Total 50 69 
Use FIFO 29 18 
Do not use FIFO 21 51 
Total 50 69 
 
Table 8: Additional database sample variables definition and measurement 
Variable Type of variable Measurement method 
   
Firm Size (ASSETS) Independent variable Measured by using total assets  
 
Risk (BETAi) Control variable The firm–specific systematic risk measured by the 
company’s beta estimated from the market model. 
Beta computed using the daily returns around 
December 31, 2000 and a value weighted market 
index. Beta was obtained from the CMA in Cairo. 
 
Capital intensity (CIi) Control variable The fixed assets divided by total sales  
Competition (CRi) Control variable Concentration ratios were measured by eight–firms 
concentration ratios for industries (percentage of 
sales).  
 
PROFITi Control variable Measured as earnings before interest and taxes for 
the financial year divided by the book value of assets. 
 
TAXRATEi Control variable Tax expense divided by net income. 
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Table 9: A Summary of Results for the Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
Depreciation Inventory 
Survey Database Survey Database 
Null for H1 rejected  H1a H1b 
p = 0.0003** p = 0.0001** p = 0.001** p = 0.001** 
Null for H2 rejected  H2a H2b 
p = 0.105 p = 0.033* p = 0.158 p = 0.165 
 *significant at the 5% level 
 **significant at the 1% level 
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 Appendix 1: Comparison of cash flows with taxable and non-taxable enhancements of 
accounting income 
Bonus receipts 
Assume that bonuses are paid as a percentage of after tax accounting income. 
E1 = the increase in income from an accounting adjustment that is not subject to taxation 
E2 = the increase in income from an accounting adjustment that is subject to taxation 
b  = the proportion of accounting income increases that is paid in bonuses to managers 
t = the rate of tax paid on income 
B1 = the amount of bonus paid on E1 
B2 = the amount of bonus paid on E2 
Assume that E1  = E2 = E 
B1 = bE        [1] 
B2 = bE (1 - t)        [2] 
B1 – B2 = tbE        [3] 
The conclusion from this is that managers with bonuses based on after tax profits will always 
receive less bonus from enhancements subject to taxation than from those that are not – the 
reduction will be reflected by the rate of taxation. 
 
Firm’s cash flows 
Now consider the differential effects of E1 and E2 on the firm’s cash flows – ignoring lags in the 
payment of taxes. The latter merely complicates the illustration without adding additional 
insights. 
Let C1 = cash outflows from E1 
 C2 = cash outflows from E2 
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Then C1 = bE        [4] 
 C2 = tE + bE (1 - t) 
       = E (t + b – tb)       [5] 
 C2 – C1 = tE (1 - b)       [6] 
Hence, even after the reduction in bonus consequent on E2 instead of E1, the firm suffers the 
outflow of cash as a consequence of making adjustments that create tax charges instead of those 
that do not create such charges. 
 
Effects of current bonuses on future bonuses 
Assume that managers expect that they will remain in post for the next operating period and that 
their bonuses will remain at b of accounting enhancements. Further, assume that they expect that 
investments I made in the current period will yield I (1 + r) in period 2. Then it will be 
worthwhile for managers to forgo bonus bE1 if that sum is re-invested and  
p < i < r  
where p = managers’ time preferences consumption, i = their opportunity cost of capital 
(i.e. the rate at which they can personally invest). 
For then they would prefer to invest rather than to consume and  
 bE1 (1 + i) < bE1 (1 + r) 
Hence, the bonus hypothesis implicitly assumes either that p > r, that i > r or that the manager 
does not anticipate continuity of employment on the same terms. 
Avoidance of E2 provides proportionately more cash to invest (∆ I) than avoidance of E1 – i.e. 
from [6] 
 ∆ I = tE (1 – b) 
leading to additional future bonuses (from [2]) 
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 ∆ B2F = tE (1 – b) (1 + r) (1 – t)     [7] 
With r positive and b and t less than 1, equation 7 will always provide a positive value. 
Consequently, the reward to managers for deferring receipt of bonus will always be greater when 
the enhancement in income is taxable than when it is not taxable. Note that if bonuses are paid on 
the basis of pre-tax accounting income the term ‘-t’ disappears from [7] – and the conclusion is 
unchanged. 
33 
 
Appendix 2: Univariate Statistical Analysis 
Table A1: Associations between Dependent Variables and Management bonus schemes 
Panel A: Association with Depreciation  
MP 
Survey firms Database firms 
No SLD Uses SLD Total No SLD Uses SLD Total 
No bonus scheme 18 25 43 10 17 27 
Bonus scheme 1 49 50 1 68 69 
Total  19 74 93 11 85 96 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio: 25.903 
p–value for a one–sided test: 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio: 22.303 
p–value for a one–sided test: 0.000 
Panel B: Association with Inventory  
MP 
Survey firms Database firms 
No FIFO FIFO Total No FIFO FIFO Total 
No bonus scheme 32 11 43 26 1 27 
Bonus scheme 21 29 50 51 18 69 
Total  53 40 93 77 19 96 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio: 10.171                           
p–value for a one–sided test: 0.0005 
Likelihood Ratio: 7.759 
p–value for a one– sided test: 0.003 
Note: (a) this analysis is based on the Chi-squared test; (b) there is a positive association between the use of bonus 
schemes and the use of both SLD and FIFO. 
 
Table A2: Associations between Dependent Variables and Leverage 
Panel A: Association with Depreciation  
LEV 
Survey firms Database firms 
No SLD Uses SLD Total No SLD Uses SLD Total 
 <20% 7 19 26 1 2 3 
 20-40% 6 25 31 3 10 13 
 >40-60% 2 18 20 5 28 33 
 >60-80% 4 5 9 1 29 30 
 >80% - 7 7 1 16 17 
 Total 19 74 93 11 85 96 
  
Kendall's tau–b: 0.078, DF: 4 
p–value for a one– sided test: 0.209 
Kendall's tau–b: 0.207, DF:4 
p–values for a one– sided test = 0.019 
Panel B: Association with Inventory  
LEV 
Survey firms Database firms 
No FIFO FIFO Total No FIFO FIFO Total 
 <20% 16 10 26 3 - 3 
 20-40% 17 14 31 9 4 13 
 >40-60% 11 9 20 27 6 33 
 >60-80% 7 2 9 23 7 30 
 >80% 2 5 7 15 2 17 
 Total 53 40 93 77 19 96 
  
Kendall's tau–b: 0.049, DF:4 
p–values for a one– sided test: 0.301 
Kendall's tau–b: -0.050, DF:4 
p–values for a one– sided test = 0.711 
Note: Gearing is positively associated with both SLD and FIFO. 
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Appendix 3: Selection of Variables in Multi-variate Analysis 
In the questionnaire survey, size was measured using three measures: namely, current market 
value (SIZE1), the total value of sales (SALES) and the balance sheet value of the total assets 
reported in the most recent financial statements (ASSETS). When determining the size measure to 
be employed in the current analysis for the responses to the questionnaire survey, market value 
(SIZE1) was eliminated because many respondents did not provide this information. Thus, in both 
the questionnaire survey and the database, size was initially measured using (a) the total value of 
sales (SALES) and (b) the most recently reported balance sheet figure for the total assets 
(ASSETS). For all companies in the database firms, the ‘most recently reported balance sheet 
figure’ related to the financial year ending in 2001. For the survey firms, the questionnaire 
specifically asked for the most recently reported figure. 
Control Variables 
 
The hypothesized relationship between dependent and explanatory variables is influenced by 
other factors that should be controlled in the analysis. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) argued 
that firms with (i) high systematic risk, (ii) high capital intensity technology or (iii) belonging to 
industries which have high concentration ratios have incentives to reduce the mean of their 
reported earnings through choosing income decreasing accounting choices. Their argument is 
based on the belief that high accounting profits by firms with these characteristics are more likely 
to compensate investors for the additional risk being borne and to avoid attracting new 
competitor entrants into the sector. A similar approach has been adopted in the current study. The 
three variables suggested by Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) were initially employed as controls 
in the current study; in addition, another two variables (PROFIT and TAXRATE) were also 
included as control measures. 
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The definition of risk in the current study is the beta coefficient from the market model 
which is calculated as the volatility of the company’s share relative to the volatility of the market 
as a whole. BETA coefficients were available for the 96 firms included in the database from the 
CMA in Cairo. They were computed using the daily returns around December 31, 2000 and a 
value weighted market index. Relative capital intensity (CI) was estimated by dividing fixed 
assets by total sales. As Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) suggest, the concentration ratio (CR) is 
assumed to be a proxy variable for the ability of a firm to earn monopoly rents. It was measured 
by the eight largest firms’ concentration ratios for their industries (their percentage of the sector’s 
sales). Since unsuccessful firms are more likely to choose income increasing accounting 
procedures than their successful counterparts, PROFIT was also included as a control variable. 
PROFIT was measured as the earnings before interest and taxes for the financial year divided by 
the book value of assets. In addition, since inventory method choices could be affected by tax 
incentives, TAXRATE was included as a control variable. The TAXRATE is the firm's tax rate 
calculated by dividing the tax expense by net income before taxes. 
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Appendix 4: Multicollinearity in the logistic model 
 
The strong correlation between SALES and ASSETS (Kendall’s tau–b = 0.722 in the survey and 
0.532 in the database) revealed the possibility that multi–collinearity could exist between these 
variables. No collinearity diagnostics are available from logistic regression in SPSS. However, 
since collinearity is solely a function of the independent variables, one could use linear regression 
to determine the extent to which collinearity is present.. Thus, one dependent 'Y' variable was 
supplied and the same independent variables on the regression models statement that developed 
in the logistic model were tested. Ideally, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent 
variable should be 1 (this would happen when variables in the model are orthogonal). Values of 
VIF exceeding 5 are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity, but in a weaker model, which 
is often the case in logistic regression, values above 2.5 may be a cause for concern. The VIF for 
SALES and ASSETS variables were 2.452 and 2.517 respectively for survey firms and 2.142 and 
2.356 respectively for database firms. Thus, the standard error of the coefficient of the ASSETS 
variable for survey was larger than it would have been with in the absence of multicollinearity 
(values above 2.5) and the standard error of the coefficient of ASSETS variable for the database 
was very close to 2.5. Since both SALES and ASSETS variables were used as alternative proxies 
for size, one of these two variables was dropped from the analysis. 
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Table A3: Collinearity statistics 
 
Variable 
Survey Database 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
MP 0.729 1.371 0.851 1.175 
LEV 0.894 1.118 0.611 1.638 
LEV1 - -  0.660 1.514 
SALES 0.408 2.452 0.467 2.142 
ASSETS 0.397 2.517 0.424 2.356 
TAXRATE 0.763 1.310 0.478 2.092 
BETA - -  0.630 1.587 
CI - -  0.637 1.570 
CR - -  0.881 1.135 
PROFIT - -  0.459 2.176 
Tolerance = 1 / VIF. These results are from an OLS regression of y-variable 
depreciation on all independent and control variables. 
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Appendix 5: Multivariate Statistical Analysis 
 
Table A4: Associations in the Logistic Analysis 
 DEP INV 
 Value of B p-value Value of B p-value 
Survey: 
Bonus Scheme (B1) 
 
3.653 
 
0.0003** 
 
1.449 
 
0.016* 
Gearing (B2) 0.298 0.105 0.190 0.158 
Database: 
Bonus Scheme (B1) 
 
4.178 
 
0.0001** 
 
2.273 
 
0.016* 
Gearing (B2) 0.037 0.033* 0.005 0.165 
Notes: (a) All identified associations were positive, (b) Sales (B3) showed no significant associations at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
